Electronic warfare (EW) has become one of the most visible technological elements of modern warfare. It is discussed in connection with countering FPV drones, protecting vehicles, disrupting navigation, and attempts to interfere with satellite communications. At the same time, EW is often imagined as a universal “dome” capable of switching off any drone or radio link. In reality, it is a collection of different tools, each with specific capabilities, limitations, and side effects.
To understand what EW can and cannot do, it is important to distinguish between system types, understand the basic principle of radio interference, and avoid confusing advertised specifications with effectiveness demonstrated in combat.
What Are EW, Electronic Intelligence, and Electronic Jamming?
Electronic warfare (EW) is a set of activities and capabilities that use the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, disrupt, or protect electronic systems. In broad terms, EW includes both influencing an adversary’s signals and protecting friendly electronic systems.
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) involves collecting information by intercepting and analysing electromagnetic emissions. Specialised equipment may, for example, detect activity from certain radio transmitters or help identify where a signal source is operating. ELINT does not necessarily create interference: its primary purpose is information gathering.
Electronic jamming means generating interference that makes it harder or impossible to receive a desired signal. In everyday language, this is often called “blocking” or “jamming” a signal. In military practice, it is one type of electromagnetic effect, not a synonym for every EW task.
This article focuses mainly on EW. Electronic intelligence deserves its own discussion because detecting a signal, locating its source, and disrupting a communications link are different tasks that require different capabilities.
How Does EW Work? A Simple Explanation
Radio communications work by transmitting information through electromagnetic waves. A transmitter generates a signal, an antenna radiates it, and a receiver tries to extract the intended information from what reaches its antenna.
An electronic jamming system creates interference in a frequency range or channel used by a particular system. If the interference at the receiver becomes strong enough compared with the useful signal, the receiver may no longer be able to interpret it correctly. The communications link may become unreliable or stop working.
However, this does not mean that any source of interference will automatically disable any device. The outcome depends on the signal-to-interference ratio, frequencies, antenna characteristics, distance, terrain, obstacles, and the design of the system being affected.
Why Jamming Does Not Always Work
- Different frequencies and channels. A system affecting one band will not necessarily affect another.
- Different protocols and transmission methods. Systems may encode signals differently, change channels, or retransmit data.
- Directional antennas. These can concentrate energy in a particular direction and change the balance between the desired signal and interference.
- Autonomous modes. A drone that loses its control link may continue along a pre-programmed route or switch to another mode. This depends on the particular model and its configuration.
- Physical conditions. Terrain, buildings, shielding, antenna placement, and distance can substantially affect the result.
- Changing technology. Frequencies, software, control links, and navigation methods continue to evolve, so a system’s effectiveness is not fixed.
EW is therefore not an invisible wall around a position. It is a tool that can reduce the likelihood that certain electronic systems will operate successfully under specific conditions. Its effectiveness must be assessed against a defined threat, rather than by an abstract claim that it “stops drones”.
How EW Systems Are Classified
There is no single classification that is equally useful for every system. One system may fit several categories at once: it may be mobile, designed to affect particular communications links, and intended to protect a specific asset. It is therefore useful to classify EW systems along several dimensions.
By Purpose
- Counter-drone systems. Designed to affect control links, data transmission, or satellite navigation used by certain categories of unmanned aircraft.
- Communications jammers. Intended to disrupt specified radio communications links.
- Navigation-interference systems. Affect reception of satellite navigation signals. This is not the same as jamming a drone’s control link.
- Systems for protecting units and sites. Intended to reduce the risk posed by defined threats, including unmanned aircraft.
- Multi-purpose systems. May combine several detection, analysis, and electromagnetic-effect capabilities.
By Mobility and Platform
- Portable systems. Compact devices that an operator can carry and deploy at a location.
- Backpack and trench systems. Designed for use near personnel or positions. Their capabilities depend on the model and antenna configuration.
- Vehicle-mounted systems. Installed on transport vehicles to protect the vehicle, crew, or a moving unit.
- Systems for armoured vehicles. Must be tested not only for radio-frequency performance but also for power supply, cooling, vibration resistance, dust and moisture protection, and compatibility with onboard electronics.
- Large mobile or fixed systems. Intended to protect sites or areas where higher power, multiple antennas, or sustained operation may be required.
By Method of Effect
Some systems generate radio-frequency interference; others affect navigation signals; complex solutions may combine several functions. Not every “counter-drone” system is an EW system: detection, physical interception, kinetic engagement, and electronic jamming are different ways of countering a threat.
Portable EW, Vehicle-Mounted Systems, and Armoured-Vehicle Protection
Portable systems are valued for their mobility and ability to be moved quickly. Their compact size, however, limits power supply, cooling, antenna options, and continuous operating time. The presence of a portable device does not mean that it can protect against every type of drone.
Backpack and trench systems can form part of the protection of a position or group of personnel. Their effectiveness depends on the signals they can disrupt, antenna placement, available power, and whether the system creates excessive interference for friendly communications equipment.
Vehicle-mounted systems may protect a vehicle while moving or when stationary, but these are different operating conditions. Antenna position, the vehicle body, the direction of the threat, surrounding obstacles, and vehicle movement can all affect performance.
Systems installed on armoured vehicles must operate in a more complex environment alongside radios, navigation equipment, sensors, and other electronics. Integration therefore requires testing not only whether a system produces the intended effect, but also whether it interferes with friendly equipment. Ukraine’s Quasar 3M system, for example, underwent testing for installation on armoured platforms. Such testing demonstrates work on integration; it is not, by itself, universal proof of battlefield effectiveness for every system in this category.
Large and fixed systems may support longer operation or cover a larger area, but they require power, maintenance, and coordination with other systems. More power does not automatically mean better results: frequency range, antennas, propagation conditions, and the specific task matter as well.
Why EW Can Interfere with Friendly Systems
Radio waves do not distinguish between friendly and hostile receivers. If a friendly system operates in a band affected by interference, it may be affected too. Uncoordinated use of EW can therefore degrade friendly radios, navigation devices, drones, and other electronic equipment.
Potential side effects include:
- disruption or degradation of friendly communications and navigation;
- electromagnetic incompatibility with vehicle electronics;
- substantial power and cooling requirements;
- the possibility that an active emitter will be detected by adversary electronic-intelligence systems;
- the need to coordinate different systems so that they do not interfere with one another.
EW should not be assessed in isolation from the wider communications, command, and protection architecture. The practical value of a system depends not only on its technical specifications, but also on how it is used, its compatibility with other equipment, and coordination with other capabilities.
EW Against Starlink: What Is Known?
Satellite communications have often been regarded as a difficult target for traditional electronic jamming. But “difficult to jam” does not mean “impossible to disrupt under any circumstances”. The result depends on the system architecture, terminal location, signal directions, interference characteristics, and the specific way the link is being targeted.
In July 2026, Reuters reported, citing Ukrainian commanders and drone operators, that Russia was using a system called “Volna Kupol Garant” that they said could disrupt Starlink over a certain area. Ukrainian sources quoted in the report described an approximate affected area of 20 square kilometres and said that such systems had been detected and some had been struck. These figures should be presented as claims from Ukrainian sources, not as independently verified universal specifications. Reuters noted that SpaceX and Russia’s Ministry of Defence did not comment.
It is important to distinguish radio-frequency jamming from blocking a terminal at the service level. In the first case, radio interference makes signal reception more difficult. In the second, the network operator makes a decision about whether a device can access the service. Both may appear to a user as a loss of connectivity, but the causes and remedies are different.
The Starlink example illustrates a general principle: even a technology long considered resilient to a particular type of interference may become the target of specialised methods. However, reports about an individual system do not prove that it can reliably disable Starlink everywhere or under all conditions.
Ukrainian EW Systems: Specific Developments and Notable Features
Ukrainian EW is not a single type of device. It covers a wide range of technologies, from compact systems protecting positions to complexes that combine radar detection, signal analysis, and electronic effects. The following examples show how diverse the tasks facing Ukrainian developers have become.
Ai-Petri: More Than Jamming
Ai-Petri SV stands out for combining several components. According to information published during the system’s presentation at MSPO 2026, the complex can combine electronic-warfare equipment, radar, and an antenna for detecting drone signals. The developer also said that data can be integrated into the Lyra situational-awareness software system. The idea is not simply to transmit interference continuously, but to detect an aerial threat and coordinate a response using other sources of information. These are capabilities described by the manufacturer’s representative, not an independent assessment of performance in every combat scenario. See the report on Ai-Petri at MSPO 2026.
The report also described mobile and fixed versions. This flexibility matters because a system intended to protect a specific site does not necessarily have the same requirements as one that must be transported and rapidly deployed.
Lima and Pokrova: Navigation Interference, Not Just “Jamming”
Lima is notable because it has been described as a system associated with countering satellite navigation, rather than simply a broad-spectrum jammer. According to reports citing Ukrainian military sources and media coverage, such systems have become one component of the wider Pokrova system, which uses interference with navigation signals, including spoofing. This differs from simple jamming: a receiver may not only lose a signal, but may also receive false navigation data. The effect depends on the weapon, its receiver, and its resistance to interference.
Open-source reports have included claims by Lima’s manufacturer about substantial numbers of targets intercepted or diverted. Such figures should be clearly attributed to the manufacturer; publicly available information does not allow every claimed result to be independently verified. At the same time, reports about further versions, including Lima Quant, and adaptations to changes in adversary navigation antennas illustrate a key feature of this field: a system that worked against an earlier threat may need rapid updates. Read the report on Lima and the Pokrova system.
Quasar 3M: Integrating EW on Armoured Vehicles Is an Engineering Challenge
Quasar 3M illustrates why simply attaching an existing EW device to an armoured vehicle is not enough. According to reporting on its testing, the manufacturer tested the system on light and medium armoured platforms, including the Gyurza, MaxxPro, and Novator. The process had to account for vibration, dust and water, antenna cabling, heat, and operation near the vehicle’s metal body and moving components. Metal surfaces and antenna placement can change electromagnetic conditions, so a configuration that works on a test range or civilian vehicle may not transfer unchanged to an armoured platform.
According to the manufacturer’s information, the Quasar 3M modification passed checks against requirements for installation on armoured vehicles. This is an important integration milestone, but it should not be interpreted as proof that every configuration will protect a vehicle from every type of FPV drone. More details are available in this report on Quasar 3M testing.
Kvertus and the Shift Toward Networked Systems
Another direction is the integration of detection capabilities with electronic-warfare systems. A report by Ukrainska Pravda on the development of Ukraine’s counter-drone protection describes an approach in which electronic sensors detect signal activity, provide alerts, and help operators coordinate EW equipment. The article also discusses the Atlas project, which combines the Mirage electronic-warfare system with the Azimuth electronic-surveillance system. According to the developer, the aim is to connect multiple devices into a coordinated network rather than treat every transmitter as an isolated piece of equipment.
This approach matters for a simple reason: an EW system cannot respond optimally to a threat it has not detected. At the same time, networked operation requires reliable data, trained operators, and coordination. Project descriptions should be distinguished from independently confirmed results. See the overview of Ukrainian detection and EW systems.
What These Examples Tell Us
- Different threats require different solutions. Disrupting an FPV control link, interfering with satellite navigation, and detecting radio signals are not the same task.
- Integration matters as much as the transmitter. Radar, sensors, software, antennas, and command systems can determine a complex’s practical value.
- Vehicle protection requires dedicated testing. Vibration, metal structures, power, cooling, and electromagnetic compatibility all affect performance.
- Adversaries adapt. Changes to communications links and navigation equipment can reduce the effectiveness of an earlier system version, making feedback and updates essential.
- Delivery numbers are not effectiveness metrics. Production and supply figures show the scale of the industry, but do not by themselves establish how a system performs against a specific threat.
Ukrainian development is notable not only for the number of models, but also for the range of approaches: from local protection for a single vehicle to systems that combine detection, analysis, and electronic effects. Specific performance figures, ranges, and success rates should be published only with a clear source and test conditions; results from one scenario should not be assumed to apply to every combat situation.
Is EW Dangerous to People?
Yes, sufficiently intense radio-frequency exposure can be hazardous, but the risk cannot be determined solely from a device’s name or a number on its specification sheet. The main established effect of radio-frequency fields at sufficiently high exposure levels is tissue heating. The World Health Organization notes that very high short-term exposure can be harmful, while available evidence has not established harm from low-level exposure under typical conditions. This does not mean it is safe to stand near any high-power transmitter: the conditions must be assessed for the specific equipment.
Why There Is No Universal “Safe Power in Watts”
A transmitter’s output power in watts (W) is not the same as the level of radiation at a person’s location. Exposure depends on:
- the signal frequency;
- transmitter power and operating mode;
- antenna gain and directionality;
- distance from the antenna and its orientation;
- duration of exposure and transmission pattern;
- whether a person is in the antenna’s near field or far field, as well as the surrounding environment.
Two transmitters with the same output power can therefore produce different field levels where a person is standing. Likewise, a lower-power device is not necessarily safe at every position close to its antenna.
The 2020 ICNIRP guidelines for radio frequencies from 100 kHz to 300 GHz specify reference levels that depend on frequency and assessment conditions. For example, from 2 to 300 GHz, the reference power-density level for the general public is 10 W/m², while the occupational reference level is 50 W/m² under the relevant averaging conditions. These values are not transmitter output power and cannot be used as a simple formula for calculating a safe distance. In the antenna’s near field, other assessment methods may be needed, including evaluation against basic restrictions.
These international guidelines should not automatically be described as Ukrainian legal limits. For specific equipment, follow current national requirements, manufacturer documentation, measurements, and occupational-safety instructions.
Practical Safety Rules
- Do not touch antennas or deliberately stand very close to an active emitter.
- Observe the exclusion zone and operating rules specified by the manufacturer.
- Do not calculate a safe distance solely from the power rating in watts or from online advice.
- Do not measure fields near military equipment without appropriate instruments, authorisation, and qualified personnel.
- Consider not only radio-frequency exposure, but also electrical safety, heat, batteries, generators, and other equipment-related hazards.
For civilians, the main rule is simple: do not approach active EW systems or try to test them yourself. Safe conditions must be determined for the specific system, not by one universal number.
Common Myths About EW
Myth 1: EW Can Switch Off Any Drone
No. The result depends on the drone, its communications and navigation links, flight mode, and the specific EW system. Some aircraft can continue flying autonomously, while others use different technical solutions.
Myth 2: More Power Always Means a Better System
Not necessarily. Frequency coverage, antennas, directionality, response time, compatibility with friendly equipment, mobility, and suitability for the threat all matter. Excessive or poorly coordinated emissions can interfere with friendly systems.
Myth 3: If a System Is Approved for Use, It Is Guaranteed to Work at the Front
Approval is an important step toward operational use, but battlefield conditions change. Effectiveness depends on the scenario, adversary countermeasures, equipment condition, and whether the system’s configuration remains current.
Myth 4: EW Is Always Invisible to the Adversary
An active transmitter emits radio signals. Under certain conditions, an adversary may detect those emissions with electronic-intelligence equipment and use the information to estimate where the system is operating.
Myth 5: EW and Air Defence Are the Same Thing
No. EW can interfere with electronic systems, but it does not replace every other form of defence. Protection against aerial threats may combine detection, EW, physical interception, and other capabilities.
Myth 6: Any Loss of Starlink Means It Has Been Jammed
No. A loss of connectivity may result from radio interference, power or equipment problems, reception conditions, or restrictions on access to the service. Establishing the cause requires specific evidence, not simply the fact that a connection is unavailable.
How EW May Evolve
EW is a continuous technological contest. As new communications links, navigation solutions, and autonomous modes spread, both offensive systems and defensive methods change. Fast equipment updates, regular testing, compatibility with friendly systems, and feedback about real-world results are becoming increasingly important.
The most effective approach is not to rely on one universal device, but to combine several complementary layers of protection. EW can be an important part of that system, but its capabilities should be assessed realistically: against a specific threat, using validated tests and practical results.
EW Protects Positions and Cities - Remember What Is Being Defended
Electronic warfare is not needed only on the frontline. EW systems are used to counter drones and protect units and vehicles, while protection against aerial threats also matters for logistics, infrastructure, and areas farther from the line of contact. The war is not confined to the frontline, and cities under threat remain part of the country’s shared experience.
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This article is for informational purposes only. It is not an instruction manual for deploying, configuring, or using electronic-warfare equipment in combat.
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